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This paper shows that consumers may buy more of a taxed good if it is sold by a two-sided 
platform firm. Two-sided platform industries serve distinct customer groups that are 
connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media 
industry (newspapers/magazines and advertisers), banking (cardholder and merchant), and the 
software industry (users and application developers). The paper compares ad-valorem and 
specific taxes and shows that they may have opposite effects on quantities sold, and that the 
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and quantities not previously recognized. 
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A benchmark result in economics is that consumers buy less of a taxed good.1 In
this paper we show a new result. Consumers may actually buy more of a taxed good
if it is sold by a two-sided platform ﬁrm. In particular, a higher ad-valorem tax may
lower the end-user price and increase sales.
By deﬁnition, a two-sided platform ﬁrm serves two diﬀerent groups of customers
that are connected through interdependent demand.2 Our analysis shows that in
such markets, an increase in the ad valorem tax in one side of the market aﬀects
the relative proﬁtability between the two markets, making the ﬁrm want to shift its
earnings to the market where the tax rate is unchanged. To see the logic involved
consider a ﬁrm that sells good A in market A and good B in market B. Suppose
there is a positive externality from market A to market B, say, in the sense that
sales in market B are positively correlated with sales in market A. In such a case
the ﬁr mm a yg e n e r a t em o r ei n c o m ei nm a r k e tBi fi tr e d u c e st h ep r i c ea n di n c r e a s e s
output in market A.
An example of the incentive mechanism at work above can be illustrated by a
media ﬁrm, which derives income from selling a newspaper and advertisements, and
where the income from advertisements depends positively on newspaper sales. An
increase in the ad valorem tax rate on the newspaper may induce the media ﬁrm
to rely more on income from advertisements because it can reduce the burden of
the tax by lowering the price on the newspaper and attract more readers. This will
increase the proﬁt margin of the media ﬁrm in the market for advertisements. In
the extreme, a very high tax on newspapers can lead the media ﬁrm to provide the
newspaper free of charge and rely on income from advertising only.
In order to bring forth our results we set up a general model of a two-sided
market, and show the exact conditions for when a tax increase causes the end-user
p r i c et of a l la n dd e m a n dt or i s e . F o rt h es a k eo fc o n v e n i e n c e ,w eu s et h em e d i a
1An overview of the tax incidence literature is given by Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
2Evans (2003a,b) provides examples and classiﬁcations of two-sided markets.
2example above to explain our results, but our model is general in nature.
Two-sided platform ﬁrms are found in major businesses such as the media indus-
try, the ﬁnancial sector, real-estate brokerage, and the computing industry. Many
two-sided platform ﬁrms receive favorable tax treatment. Newspapers, for exam-
ple, are taxed at a reduced rate or completely exempted from value-added taxation
in most countries, since governments consider such publications to be an essential
channel for disseminating vital information about e.g. culture, politics, and inter-
national aﬀairs. Similarly, many countries exempt credit card services from value
added taxation, partly in order to disseminate the use of these services among all
income groups.
An important feature of a two-sided platform ﬁrm is that its pricing strategies
must account for interactions between the demands of multiple customer groups and
the externalities that arise in these relationships (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In the
media industry, advertising may be perceived as a nuisance (a negative externality)
or a beneﬁt (a positive externality) by readers.3 Am e d i aﬁrm can internalize this
externality by charging advertisers and readers/viewers appropriately. We show that
the sign and size of such externalities are decisive for the eﬀects of changes in ad
valorem tax rates.
Our analysis is related to a growing literature on Industrial Organization that
analyzes the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms in two-sided markets. However, this
literature does not consider taxation issues.4 The literature on indirect taxation, on
the other hand, does not consider two-sided markets.5
Closest to the spirit of our analysis are an early paper by Edgeworth (1925) and
follow-up contributions by Hotelling (1932), Wicksell (1934), and Bailey (1954).
Edgeworth argued that higher commodity taxation under certain conditions may
3The nature of these externalities is further discussed in the formal model below.
4See for instance Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2005),
and Armstrong (2005).
5E.g., Keen and Delipalla (1992), Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1998) and Anderson et. al.
(2001a, 2001b). For a survey, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
3reduce end-user prices if demand for two diﬀerent goods is directly interrelated.
This possibility has later been labelled Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox. As an illus-
tration, Edgeworth considered demand for ﬁrst-class and third-class railway tickets.
His assessment was that a tax imposed on ﬁrst-class tickets may give the railway
company an incentive to reduce the price of the untaxed good - third-class tickets -
in order to sell more of it. Indeed, under certain conditions the price of both types
of tickets will fall subsequent to the tax increase.6
There are probably many reasons why no link has been made between Edge-
worth’s Taxation Paradox and indirect taxation in two-sided markets. First, the
speciﬁc example used by Edgeworth is admittedly peculiar, and may explain why it
has been almost forgotten in the literature.7 Second, the example given by Edge-
worth relates to a one-sided market with substitutes.8 Third, Edgeworth focused
solely on speciﬁc taxes, and not on the more widely used ad valorem tax. As shown
in our analysis, the most interesting policy recommendations arise when we compare
the eﬀects of speciﬁc and ad valorem taxes, as indeed more recent contributions have
emphasized (e.g., Delipalla and Keen 1992).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up a model of a two-
sided platform and analyzes the eﬀects of an ad valorem tax on quantities and prices.
Section 3 discusses policy implications and carries out an analysis with respect to
speciﬁc taxes, while Section 4 presents conclusions and discusses some extensions to
the model.
6See Creedy (1988) for a good overview and discussion of this literature.
7For example, it is not mentioned in the Handbook of Public Economics (see Fullerton and
Metcalf 2002).
8Bailey (1954) shows the precise conditions under which the tax paradox may arise, and points
out a mistake in Hotelling’s analysis.
42T h e M o d e l
Consider a two-sided monopoly platform ﬁrm selling good C to consumers, say,
at price q,a n dg o o dX to producers, say, at price p. We assume that both the
consumers and the producers are price takers. Let c and x denote the respective
quantities of the two goods. The inverse demand function for each good is downward-
sloping, so that the own-price eﬀects are negative; qc ≡ ∂q/∂c<0 and px ≡ ∂p/∂x<
0 (subscripts henceforth denote partial derivatives). The willingness to pay for each
good, however, may also depend on how much is sold of the other good. The sale of
good X imposes a positive externality on the willingness to pay for good C if qx > 0
and a negative externality if qx < 0.9 In the same manner, good C may impose
a positive or negative externality on demand for good X.T h e i n v e r s e d e m a n d
functions can thus be written as q = q(c,x,ω) and p = p(c,x,ω), where ω is a
vector of other factors that may aﬀect demand, including the general VAT rate (T)
in society.
Examples that ﬁt the model structure above can be found in many sectors
of the economy, such as the media industry (or banking) where C is a newspa-
per/broadcasting (banking; credit cards) and good X is advertising space (banking;
shops that accept cards). For the sake of convenience and to emphasize the eco-
nomic intuition and policy relevance of our results, we shall in what follows relate our
model to a media ﬁrm (the platform) selling a newspaper to readers and advertising
space to ﬁrms.
An ad valorem tax (t) is levied on good C, which implies that the platform
receives the price q/(1 + t) from the consumers. The tax rate t may deviate from
the general VAT rate T. Our focal point here is to examine the eﬀects of a change
in the tax rate t, holding T and other elements in ω ﬁxed. For this reason we do
not model ad valorem taxes on ads, and in what follows we shall suppress ω in the
9This is an externality since producers and consumers are price takers. Thus, they do not take
into account the eﬀect of their actions on the demand in either side of the market.
5inverse demand functions.10
The platform has the following proﬁtl e v e l :









where k(c,x) is the cost function, with ki ≥ 0 (i = c,x).
The ﬁrst-order condition for good X (πx =0 )i m p l i e s
[p + xpx]+
£
cqx (1 + t)
−1¤
= kx. (2)
The ﬁrst squared bracket in equation (2) is marginal revenue on the advertising side
of the market of selling more ads. In optimum, this term would be equal to marginal
cost (kx) in a standard one-sided market. The second squared bracket captures the
fact that sales of advertising (good X)m a yi n ﬂuence sales of newspapers (good
C). This term is negative if demand for newspapers is decreasing in the level of
advertising (that is, qx < 0), while it is greater than zero if advertising imposes
a positive externality on demand for newspapers. In the former case, the level of
advertising should be set lower than the level that maximizes proﬁt in the advertising
market in isolation, while the opposite is true if a larger advertising volume increases
demand for newspapers.




+ xpc = kc. (3)
The ﬁrst squared bracket is marginal revenue from selling the newspaper (good
C) to consumers, and should be equal to kc if pc =0 . However, if demand for ads
is higher the larger the number of readers (pc > 0), proﬁt is maximized by raising
the sale of newspapers beyond the volume that maximizes proﬁt in the consumer
market (and vice versa for pc < 0).
10We hold T ﬁxed, reﬂecting the view that the general VAT level is determined by more overriding
concerns than targeted tax policy in one single market. Note also that interﬁrm value-added taxes
(e.g. on ad revenues) are fully rebated by the government under VAT.
6From the ﬁrst-order conditions we see that equilibrium prices and quantities on
both sides of the market depend on the tax rate. Since p = p(c,x) and q = q(c,x),



















The second-order conditions for proﬁt maximum require that πxx < 0, πcc < 0,
and H ≡ πxxπcc − π2
xc > 0.
I no r d e rt oh a v eat w o - s i d e dm a r k e t ,t h e r em u s tb ep o s i t i v ee x t e r n a l i t i e sf r o m
at least one side of the market to the other.11 The implication is that pc > 0
and/or qx > 0, but whether both terms are positive depends on the particularities
of the industry in question. Related to our media example, we cannot predetermine
the sign of qx, since empirical evidence does not give a clear answer as to whether
consumers consider advertising to be a good or a bad. However, other things equal,
it is reasonable to assume that the willingness to pay for advertising (p) is increasing
in the number of readers. We shall consequently assume that pc > 0:
Assumption 1: pc > 0.
It should be emphasized that the model is applicable to two-sided markets in
general and that our mathematical derivations and results also hold for pc ≤ 0 (in
which case two-sidedness requires qx > 0).
For the analysis to follow, the sign of πxc is of particular relevance. Diﬀerentiating
equation (2) or (3) we ﬁnd
πxc = pc [1 + εp]+qx [1 + εq] − kxc, (5)
where εp ≡ x
pc
∂pc




11Evans (2003b) deﬁnes a two-sided market as one where we have (a) two distinct groups of
customers, (b) positive network externalities (at least from one of the customer groups to the
other), and (c) an intermediary that internalizes the externalities between the groups. See Rochet
and Tirole (2004) for a more formal deﬁnition.
7The variable πxc measures how the marginal proﬁtability of selling advertising
space, πx, changes if the number of readers increases. One might think that πxc is
positive, given the assumption that the willingness to pay for advertising is increasing
in the number of readers; pc > 0. However, this is not necessarily true. To see why,
note that ∂pc/∂x<0 if the marginal value of a larger readership for the advertisers
is decreasing in the advertising volume. Thus, the ﬁrst term in (5) may be negative;
this is the case when the elasticity of pc with respect to x is smaller than minus
one (εp < −1). The interpretation of the second term in (5) is similar; this term is
negative if consumers are ad-lovers (qx > 0)a n dεq < −1, or if consumers dislike
ads (qx < 0)a n dεq > −1. Summing up, it is thus clear that the sign of πxc is
ambiguous.12 In order to simplify the discussion in the main text, we shall assume
that πxc > 0:
Assumption 2: πxc > 0.
In the Appendix we discuss how to interpret our results if πxc < 0.
2.1 Non-positive externalities from the producer side
In what follows, we examine in detail how diﬀerent assumptions regarding the ex-
ternalities between the two groups aﬀect output and prices.
2.1.1 Zero externalities from the producer side (qx =0 )
If readers are indiﬀerent to the advertising level, we have qx ≡ 0. To ﬁnd how a higher
value-added tax aﬀe c t ss a l e si nt h et w os i d e so ft h em a r k e t ,w et o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiate
ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n s( 2 )a n d( 3 )t oﬁnd13
dc
dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qx=0
=
−πxx (xpc − kc)
H (1 + t)
> 0 if (xpc − kc) > 0. (6)
12Note also that with a suﬃciently high value of kxc, πxc m a yb en e g a t i v ee v e ni ft h eﬁrst two
terms in (5) are positive.
13T h ef u l ld e r i v a t i o ni ss t a t e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
8With qx =0we further see from equation (4) that the eﬀect on prices is
dq
dt





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qx=0
< 0 if (xpc − kc) > 0. (7)
The sign of dc/dt and dq/dt is determined by the sign of (xpc − kc), which
has a straightforward economic explanation: The willingness to pay for advertising
increases by pc units if the newspaper attracts one more reader. With a total adver-
tising volume equal to x, the value for the newspaper of attracting one extra reader
is thus equal to xpc. If this value is greater than the marginal cost kc of an extra
copy of the newspaper (i.e., xpc − kc > 0), we see from equations (6) and (7) that
dc/dt > 0 and dq/dt < 0. From equations (2) and (3) we further ﬁnd that a larger
number of readers allows the newspaper to sell more advertising:
dx
dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qx=0
=
πxc (xpc − kc)
H (1 + t)
> 0 if xpc − kc > 0. (8)
To put the result sin eqs. (6) and (7) into perspective, we show that, in sharp
contrast to results obtained in one-sided markets (see e.g., Delipalla and Keen, 1992),
a higher VAT may increase sales (dc/dt > 0) and reduce the price (dq/dt < 0) of the
good subject to higher taxes.
The reason for this rather paradoxical result is that in the market where the
tax is increased (newspaper) the proﬁtability falls relative to the proﬁtability in
the other market (advertising). The ﬁrm therefore wants to shift income from the
consumer side of the market to the producer side. In order to do so, it must increase
the sale of newspapers, since this leads to a higher demand for ads (as is evident
from (8)). To obtain higher sales of the newspaper (dc/dt > 0), the price of the
newspaper must be reduced (dq/dt < 0).14
Since p(c,x) is downward-sloping in own quantity, an increase in the advertising
volume tends to reduce p (px < 0). A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eﬁrm can charge a higher
14To see the intuition for this result as clearly as possible, assume that t approaches inﬁnity.
Obviously, the newspaper would then have no reason to charge a positive consumer price. However,
it can still raise revenue through the advertising market and give the newspaper away for free.
9advertising price if the size of the readership increases (since pc > 0). Consequently,
it is uncertain whether the price of advertising will go up or down:
dp
dt








R 0 if πxc > 0.
2.1.2 Negative externalities from the producer side (qx < 0)
When demand for newspapers depends negatively on the advertising level, we have
qx < 0. One might think that higher value-added taxes are more likely to reduce
sales of newspapers the more consumers dislike ads (as an increase in x, motivated
by proﬁts h i f t i n gt ot h ea dm a r k e t ,n o wl o w e r sc). However, total diﬀerentiation of
equations (2) and (3) makes it clear that the opposite is true:
dx
dt


































The ﬁrst term in (9) and (10) shows how advertising and newspaper sales respond
to a tax increase if consumers are indiﬀerent about ads (qx =0 ). As argued above,
this term may be positive or negative. The second term, though, is unambiguously
positive and increasing in the consumers’ disutility of ads. The reason is that if
sales in the newspaper market are adversely aﬀected by advertising (qx < 0) the
media ﬁrm has a smaller advertising level than the volume which maximizes proﬁt
in the advertising market (c.f. equation (2)). With a heavier taxation of newspaper
sales, this eﬀect becomes less important for the media ﬁrm. Other things equal, it is
optimal to increase the volume of ads, but in order to facilitate a rise in demand for
advertising the size of the readership must increase. The latter requires a reduction
in the price charged by the media ﬁrm, and more so the stronger the consumers’ dis-
taste for advertising. In particular, this implies that the tendency for the consumer
10price to fall subsequent to a tax increase is even more pronounced when qx < 0 than
when qx =0 .15 It should be noted, though, that we still cannot sign the change in
the price of advertising if both the advertising level and the size of the readership
increase.
We can now state:
Proposition 1: Suppose that qx ≤ 0. As u ﬃcient condition for a higher value-
added tax on good C to increase equilibrium quantities of both goods is that xpc >k c.
The price of good C (inclusive of VAT) is lowered, while the sign of the change in
the price of the untaxed good (X) is ambiguous.
2.2 Positive externalities from the producer side (qx > 0)
If demand for good C depends positively on output of good X,w eh a v eqx > 0. Such
a positive externality is characteristic for the banking industry, where consumers
presumably have a higher willingness to pay for holding a credit card the larger the
number of merchants that accept it. It may also be characteristic for specialized
magazines, where qx > 0 reﬂects a taste for commercials (ad-lovers). Car ads in
automobile magazines or perfume ads in beauty magazines may well be appreciated
by readers (Depken II and Wilson, 2004). In what follows, we continue to relate the
model to the media market.
Equations (9) and (10) still hold when consumers are ad lovers, but with the




















15With qc < 0 and qx < 0 it follows immediately from equation (4) that dq/dt < 0 if dx/dt > 0
and dc/dt > 0, and that the price reduction is larger the more consumers dislike ads.
11dc
dt
















If qx > 0 is small, the last term is insigniﬁcant relative to the ﬁrst one, so
that sign(dx/dt)=sign(dx/dt|qx=0) and sign(dc/dt)=sign(dc/dt|qx=0). As shown
above, we then have that quantities of both goods increase (dc/dt > 0 and dx/dt > 0)
if xpc >k c. However, if qx is suﬃciently high, it follows from equations (11) and
(12) that the sales of newspapers and advertising are decreasing in taxes. To see
why, notice that the newspaper has more commercials than the quantity which
maximizes proﬁt on the advertising side when consumers love ads (c.f. equation
(2)). An increase in VAT, though, implies that it becomes less proﬁtable for the
media ﬁrm to attract readers by having a large advertising volume. Instead, the
media ﬁrm will have incentives to reduce the level of advertising, and approach the
volume that maximizes proﬁt on the advertising side. If qx is suﬃciently high, both
the level of advertising and the demand for the media product will therefore fall.
Finally, note from equation (4) that the signs of both dp/dt and dq/dt are am-
biguous when output on both sides of the market is decreasing in t.
We can now state:
Proposition 2: If qx > 0, but is relatively small, a higher value-added tax on
good C m a yi n c r e a s eo u t p u to nb o t hs i d e so ft h em a r k e t .I f qx > 0 is suﬃciently
high, a higher VAT reduces output on both sides of the market. The eﬀects on prices
of higher taxes are ambiguous.
3 Policy Implications
In most countries newspapers are subject to a reduced value-added tax rate. In Ger-
m a n yt h e ya r es u b j e c tt oar a t eo f7 %( 1 6 %i st h er e g u l a rr a t e )w h i l ei ne . g .t h eU K
and Denmark they are exempted from value-added taxation all together (European
Commission, 2004). Newspapers are also either fully or partially exempted from
12sales taxes in a number of U.S. states. The reason for the preferential tax treatment
is that governments consider newspapers to be essential for the dissemination of
vital information regarding for instance culture, politics and international aﬀairs.
A lower tax rate is thought to reduce the newspaper price and, more importantly,
to increase the circulation of the media product. The reasoning is in line with tax
incidence analysis in a one-sided market, but the analysis above shows that this
need not hold for the newspaper industry, which typically operates in a two-sided
market. On the contrary, a lower VAT may reduce the sales of newspapers.
The analysis provides a framework for thinking about taxation also in other
industries. Credit card services, which are VAT-exempted in the European Union,
is one example.16 As the value of holding a credit card is increasing in the number of
merchants accepting it, and vice versa, we have pc > 0 and qx > 0. If, for historical
reasons, governments have wanted to increase the usage of credit cards, the policy
of exempting the use from VAT may have been eﬀective. Presently, though, the
use of credit cards has become so widespread that the network eﬀects presumably
a r em o r eo rl e s se x h a u s t e d( w h i c hi np a r t i c u l a rm e a n st h a tqx is small) in most
European countries. Since the marginal costs of a transaction for the platform (the
credit card company) are close to zero (kc ≈ 0) the analysis suggests that abolition
of preferred VAT treatment of credit card services need not have a large negative
impact on its use. In fact, we cannot disregard the possibility that the opposite
may happen; imposing a VAT may further expand the network size on both the
credit card holder and the merchant side of the market.17 This illustrates that the
eﬀectiveness of reducing the VAT-rate may depend crucially on whether or not we
16Auerbach and Gordon (2002) discuss the desirability of taxation of ﬁnancial services. Chal-
lenging the current European practice, they recommend taxation of ﬁnancial transactions. Their
analysis resorts to the standard one-sided market view.
17This certainly does not mean that credit card companies would welcome a VAT. On the
contrary, diﬀerentiating the equilibrium value of equation (1) with respect to t, and using the
envelope theorem, we ﬁnd dπ/dt = −q(x,c)(1+t)−2 < 0. The proﬁt level is thus strictly decreasing
in the tax rate.
13consider a mature industry.
The discussion above makes it clear that it is diﬃcult to ascertain the eﬀects
of VAT changes in two-sided markets without detailed knowledge about marginal
costs and externalities. The diﬃculties are particularly large in the media industry.
Depken II and Wilson (2004), for instance, ﬁnd that advertising is considered to be
a good in some paper magazines and a bad in others. Presumably, we ﬁnd a similar
variety in the public’s attitude to advertising in the newspaper industry. So what
can the government do if it wants to spur output of newspapers? A more accurate
policy than changing the VAT rate, would be to subsidize newspapers. To see this,
let the proﬁt level of the media ﬁrm be given by












where τ is a speciﬁc tax on newspapers. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the platform
are the same as before, except that the speciﬁc tax now appears as an additional
cost term in selling newspapers (c.f. equations (2) and (3)):






πc =0 = >
£
(1 + t)
−1 (qcc + q)
¤
+ xpc = kc + τ. (14)













Equation (15) makes it clear that speciﬁc taxes unambiguously have a negative
impact on output in both markets, independently of consumer preferences for ads.
The reason is that higher speciﬁc taxes are equivalent to increased unit costs, as
shown by equation (14). Since higher unit costs lower the marginal proﬁtability for
any given output, it is optimal to reduce sales of newspapers (dc/dτ < 0). As a
result, the advertising level falls (dx/dτ < 0).
14As discussed in the introduction, Edgeworth’s tax paradox asserts that a higher
speciﬁc tax on one of two goods under certain conditions may reduce the price of
both.18 To see that this holds in our context of a two-sided market, note ﬁrst that














.( 1 6 )
Equation (16) is unambiguously positive if consumers dislike ads (qx < 0˙ ).H o w -
ever, with ad-lovers (qx > 0) the second term is negative, reﬂecting that the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for the newspaper falls when the level of advertising
decreases. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, we obtain dq/dτ < 0.














is negative if the fall in readership, pc (dc/dτ), dominates the increase in ads, that is
px (dx/dτ). Equations (15) - (17) thus show that an increase in τ may reduce output
and prices of both goods.19
To summarize:
Proposition 3: Ah i g h e rs p e c i ﬁc tax on good C reduces output of both goods. If
pc and qx are positive and suﬃciently large, prices fall (Edgeworth’s tax paradox).
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 makes it clear that raising ad valorem taxes and
speciﬁct a x e sm a yh a v eo p p o s i t eq u a n t i t ye ﬀects. The reason for this is that with
18See also Bailey (1954) for a discussion.
19An example that yields this result is the following. Let p = −x/10 + c, q = z − c/10 + x and
π = xp +( q − τ)c − x2 − c2. Then we have that ∂2π1/∂c∂x =2> 0.It is easily veriﬁed that all
second-order conditions are satisﬁed. Solving ∂π/∂c = ∂π/∂x =0we ﬁnd p = x =5 0( z − τ)/21,
q = 131z/42 − 89τ/42 and c =5 5 ( z − τ)/21, from which it is immediately clear that a higher
tax rate reduces all prices and quantities. Related to the media market, we may intuitively regard
the reduction in readership (resp. advertising) as a quality reduction of the newspaper from the
advertisers’ (resp. readers) point of view. Other things equal, this leads to a lower willingness to
pay for the newspaper on both sides of the market.
15speciﬁc taxes, there is a one-to-one relationship between tax payments and quantity,
while there is no direct link between output and the burden of taxation under ad
valorem taxation. Indeed, subsequent to a higher ad valorem tax the ﬁrm can in
principle both reduce tax payments and increase the quantity by lowering the price.
Put diﬀerently, in this case the ﬁrm has two instruments at its disposal, compared to
only one under speciﬁc taxes. In a multi-sided market this diﬀerence has profound
implications for ﬁrm behavior, and thus for public policy in a context where output
p e rs ei sc o n s i d e r e dt ob ei m p o r t a n t .
4C o n c l u s i o n
Traditional analysis of tax incidence has focused on conventional (one-sided) mar-
kets, where the sale of one good does not directly aﬀect the sale of other goods.
In such markets a general insight is that indirect taxes are partly shifted (or even
overshifted) onto consumers, resulting in lower sales of the taxed good. Our analy-
sis has shown that this result is challenged in a two-sided market. If demand for
the taxed good matters for sales of a product in another market, the incidence of
taxation changes. In a two-sided market an increase in an ad valorem tax may, un-
der certain conditions, lead to lower prices for both goods as well as to higher sales.
The results obtained under ad valorem taxation are in sharp contrast to our ﬁndings
under speciﬁct a x a t i o n ,w h e r eah i g h e rt a xu nambiguously has a negative eﬀect on
output.
Our study has been carried out in a monopoly setting. An interesting path
for future research would be to check the robustness of our results under diﬀerent
market structures. However, we believe that the main results in this paper would
survive under oligopoly as well. As long as ﬁr m sh a v es o m em a r k e tp o w e r ,at a x
increase on one side of the market implies that the ﬁrms will have incentives to shift
proﬁt to the other side of the market. In an appendix, available from the authors
upon request, we show that this conjecture holds in a simple duopoly model with
16linear demand functions.
Even though our discussion is related to the media market, we have not incorpo-
rated any of the particularities of the media market or the advertising market into
the model. The reason is that we have used a model suﬃciently general in structure
to highlight the most common mechanisms in two-sided markets. We have also ab-
stained from welfare analysis. Such analysis would hinge on speciﬁc characteristics
of the industry in question. In the media market, this would for instance require
that we make assumptions about whether advertising is persuasive or informative.
This said, we believe that there is also a need for industry-speciﬁc analysis, both
theoretically and empirically.
5A p p e n d i x
Derivation of the relationship between quantities and ad valorem taxes
We assume that the second order conditions hold with non-negative prices and
quantities, so that the equilibrium is characterized by ﬁrst order conditions (2) and
(3). To ﬁnd how a higher value-added tax aﬀects prices on the two sides of the











































¶2 πxx (1 + t)(xpc − kc)+πxccqx
H
. (19)
Consequences of relaxing the assumption that πcx > 0
Suppose that πxc < 0 and qx =0 . From equations (6) and (7) we see that a
higher ad valorem tax still increases sales of the newspaper and reduces its price if
xpc −kc > 0:thus the media ﬁrm’s incentive to sell a larger number of newspapers
in order to shift revenue to the advertising side is unaltered. However, from equation
(8) we ﬁnd that dx/dt < 0if πxc < 0.
If qx < 0, we know that there will be less advertising than the volume which
maximizes proﬁt on the advertising side of the market. If the ad valorem tax rate
on sales of newspapers increases, the media ﬁrm will care less about the revenue it
captures directly from the readers. This is true independent of whether πxc > 0 or
πxc < 0. The second term in equation (9) shows that this eﬀect makes the media
ﬁrm sell more advertising space if t increases. However, the second term in equation
(10) makes it clear that this tends to reduce the sales of newspapers.
To grasp the intuition for this result, assume that πxc < 0 because kxc is large. In
order to save costs, the media ﬁrm will then have incentives to reduce the circulation
of the newspaper when the advertising volume increases.20
The case where qx > 0 has a similar interpretation. If the consumers are ad
lovers, the newspaper has more ads than the level that maximizes proﬁto nt h e
advertising side of the market. Independent of the sign on πxc, the newspaper will
therefore reduce the advertising level if t increases (dx/dt < 0). However, a lower
advertising level means that the marginal proﬁt of selling newspapers increases if
πxc < 0, which induces the newspaper to sell more newspapers (dc/dt > 0).
The eﬀects of assuming πxc < 0 when we consider speciﬁc taxes are analogous,
20For the same reason, we see from equation (15) that a higher speciﬁc tax on newspapers -
which always reduces sales of newspapes - increases the advertising volume if πxc < 0.
18and seen from equations (15) - (17).
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